The “A-theist” Christ: Kenosis as a Way of an Identification with Atheists in the Theology of Anthony Bloom by Stanciu, Teofil
195
The “A-theist” Christ: Kenosis as a Way of an 
Identification with Atheists in the Theology of 
Anthony Bloom
Teofil Stanciu






For Metropolitan Anthony Bloom, the kenosis of Christ climaxes with his 
God-forsakenness on the cross. It is this aspect of kenosis that the present 
article tries to explore and build upon. One key element will be the mea-
ning of the concept of “a-theist” Christ – coined by Bloom – and how this 
status of the incarnated Son can function as a basis for our identification 
and solidarity with today’s atheists. By the way of kenosis, the incarnation 
brings together in one hypostasis the divine and human nature. This reality 
endowed both our nature and created order with significant dignity. This 
paper explores the possibilities from this dignity and how it can serve as a 
bridge for dialogue with humanists and materialists. As Bloom suggests, this 
can open the discussion towards the secular world and Christians could take 
some responsibility for the process of secularization. The objective of this ar-
ticle is to demonstrate that Anthony Bloom’s controversial idea of “a-theist” 
Christ can become a connection point with the other and a mirror in which 
western Christians might look at some of their anthropological shortcomings 
that hamper their solidarity and dialogue with those who do not share the 
faith in God.
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Introduction
Kenotic theology has a long and tormented history as an attempt to explain what 
happened to the Son of God in the incarnation. Aware of the controversies and 
various approaches in Western theology (Coakley 2002, 3–39),1 we will turn in 
this article to the kenosis in an Orthodox perspective2 of one famous Russian lay 
theologian, exiled (in his childhood, together with his family) by the communist 
regime: Anthony Bloom, Metropolitan of Sourozh.3 
Vladimir Lossky (2005), the famous Orthodox Russian theologian, considers 
that: [t]he κνωσις is the mode of existence of the Divine Person who was sent 
into the world, the Person in whom was accomplished the common will of the 
Trinity whose source is the Father. Christ’s saying, ‘the Father is greater than I,’ 
expresses this kenotic renunciation of his own will.” When trying to define this 
mode of existence, he also states that “the perfection of the person consists in 
self-abandonment: the person expresses itself most truly in that it renounces to 
exist for itself. It is the self-emptying of the Person of the Son, the Divine κνωσις.
1 As reflected, for instance, by Sarah Coakley, in chapter “Kenōsis and Subversion: On the Repre-
ssion of ‘Vulnerability’ in Christian Feminist Writing” (Coakley 2002, 3–39). It also could be 
noted here that “it is possible to categorize the theological interpretation of kenosis in terms of 
four broad historical phases”: patristic period (especially the era of Ecumenical Councils and 
afterwards); the 16th century Lutheran discussions entailing some sort of divine concealment; 
the late 19th  and early 20th century protestant (German and British) kenoticism debating the 
divine nature of Jesus Christ; and the second half of the 20th century, when the kenosis is ap-
plied to Godhead itself (Brierley 2009, 71). These stages generated a large corpus of writings 
and subsequent interpretations and debates. Two broad categories were proposed to account 
for the kenotic Christological approaches: ontological and functionalist – with strong ontologi-
cal account at one end and weak functionalist kenoticism at the other and an entire cohort of 
different approaches in between (Crisp 2007, 119–120ff).
2 The orthodox kenotic theology has not been yet evaluated from a taxonomic perspective, alt-
hough there are some systematization attempts such as Florin Tomoioagă’s Taina chenozei în 
teologia ortodoxă a secolului al XX-lea [The Mistery of Kenosis in the Orthodox Theology of 
the XXth Century]. The book is based on a PhD dissertation defended at Aristotle University 
of Thessaloniki. His purpose was “to analyze and compare different contemporary stances on 
kenosis” through the lenses of patristic hermeneutics (Tomoioagă 2015, 16). This comparation 
though is not resulting in a taxonomy per se, but rather in a descriptive image with some im-
portant hints about the Eastern Orthodox doctrine guiding marks. To be sure, after reading the 
book, one cannot tell which theologian – among those analyzed – is more faithful to a particu-
lar patristic tradition. 
3 Some clarifications are necessary here. In this article, the standard name used to identify the 
Orthodox theologian is Anthony Bloom. However, when quoted, the name used for the specific 
article or sermon is required (hence, Sourozh appears sometimes). Because Anthony Bloom 
wrote also in Russian, in some cases, due to language barrier, the ideas or even quotations are 
attributed to Roman Rytsar, who translated them for his research.
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It is an understanding of kenosis that Metropolitan of Sourozh – as well as 
many Orthodox thinkers – would embrace with some specific emphasis, since 
“in his kenotic theology, Anthony Bloom did not mention any changes in Christ’s 
Divine nature as a result of the Incarnation” (Rytsar 2012, 110). 
Like most of the Orthodox theologians, Bloom sought to preserve the patris-
tic and Chalcedonian perspective in his theology. This theological stance affirms 
that it is by way of kenosis that God the Son became human flesh, but his divine 
nature did not suffer any diminishment in the process. At the same time, Christ’s 
human and divine natures were in full unity but without changes. This Chalcedo-
nian core belief is surrounded by an entire constellation of interpretations even 
in Eastern Orthodox theology, ranging from the more rigorous view of Justin 
Popovich (who reiterates ancient dogmatic affirmations) to the more provocative 
and daring kenoticism of Sergius Bulgakov.4
In the following pages, I will briefly present Bloom’s perspective on keno-
sis. Based on his view, I will subsequently discuss two important contact points 
where believers could meet atheists due to the kenosis of the Son of God in his in-
carnation: solidarity in the shared separation from God and human dignity that 
could be extended to the created order (investing humanism and materialism 
with new, transcendent meaning). These could prompt believers to a more genu-
ine and profound identification with any other human being by following the 
example of Jesus Christ. Hence, this might result in a new approach to secularism 
that could be understood not only as a religion’s enemy but also as an unwanted 
consequence of the way Christians represented God in the world throughout his-
tory and of the diminishment of the legitimate human value.
The culminating point of Christ’s kenosis – his suffering and his crucifixion – 
was understood by Bloom as a separation from God and it is precisely this state 
that every mortal shares and thus having a common ground with the incarnated 
Word. The exploration of some of the consequences entailed by this reality will 
reveal useful insights that could challenge the way we see those who do not be-
lieve in God, the created order, and the secular society surrounding us. 
1. Anthony Bloom on Kenosis
It may be argued that Bloom’s view of kenotic theology “is based on his inter-
pretation of the God-forsakenness of Christ on the cross” (Rytsar 2012, 127), 
whereas this climactic experience of crucifixion is also “the key to understanding 
the human person” (Rytsar 2012, 20). For the Russian metropolitan, the death 
4 Vladimir Lossky, for example, criticized fiercely Bulgakov’s “heretical” teachings (Gavrilyuk 
2005, 265–267).
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of Jesus Christ on the cross is central to his understanding of the incarnation of 
God, as the supreme expression of God’s love, and as well to his conception of 
human personhood. 
For Bloom, the kenosis begins with the act of creation, when the very decision 
of the Trinity was to take the “risk” and “responsibility” to create the world and 
human beings endowed with freedom and own will (Rytsar 2012, 102–103) and 
at this point, one could find similarities with Serge Bulgakov (Gavrilyuk 2005, 
254). The kenosis is afterward displayed in the incarnation, seen by Anthony 
Bloom (1971, 55) as “an unreserved and unlimited solidarity with men in all 
their conditions” in which God revealed himself as “humiliated, vulnerable and 
defenseless human,” but without change in his divine nature and his glory (Rytsar 
2012, 111–112).
The entire life of Jesus Christ is understood in a kenotic perspective includ-
ing his baptism, temptations, prayers to the Father, transfiguration, entry into 
Jerusalem, Gethsemane, but the culmination is in God-forsakenness and death 
on Golgotha. The possibility of death is in itself conceivable only as a separation 
from God, the source of life. Human beings turned away from God because of the 
original sin (Adam’s decision to turn away from God), they separated themselves 
from God, and thus death entered their existence and became a common life ex-
perience. Human nature was affected by the fall and its consequences, including 
death. In the incarnation, the Son of God accepted human nature in his hyposta-
sis and made it immortal (Bloom 1971, 55). Although he could not die, he freely 
accepted to experience death – the loss of God – in his human nature. He joined 
the cause of our death, he became one of us, he was in front of God “together with 
us, not only for us” (Rytsar 2012, 137–140).
2. Atheism and Solidarity
Following Maximus the Confessor for the metropolitan of Sourozh, the death 
and the loss of God are synonyms. Although the death of Jesus Christ remains a 
great mystery, his separation from God is certain, not by way of sin but by his own 
free choice to join our fundamentally tragic and mortal condition. He proved his 
full solidarity with his creatures. The perfect and sinless man accepted to share 
the extreme experience of death and God-forsakenness. And his experience was 
far more tragic because he had to lose what he loved the most, the sense and the 
reality of an intimate relationship with God the Father, in contrast with us who 
do not know or even reject God (Bloom 1971, 55). At the same time, Christ was 
also rejected by humans, facing a double abandonment. 
If we admit the reality of Christ’s experience of feeling rejected by God, then 
in his death the incarnated Son was literally without God, etymologically a-theos. 
He was in a paradoxical state of Godlessness but without sin (Bloom 1971, 56). 
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Bloom speaks of the etymological a-theism  of Christ (Sourozh 1967). This lan-
guage can be slippery and misleading and was indeed interpreted negatively and 
considered scandalous (Rytsar 2012, 222). But this did not stop the metropolitan 
of Sourozh to use it because he considered it meaningful. 
It is precisely in this essentially human experience that any other atheist, any 
human being that turned away from God, can have a connection point, a com-
mon ground with Jesus Christ as a human. No atheist in this world “ever plunged 
into the depths of godlessness as the Son of God… has done” (Bloom 1971, 56). 
It must be stressed out, he did all we know in solidarity5 – another controversial 
term deliberately used by Bloom – with human beings. And that solidarity im-
plies that “no atheist has ever gone into the loss of God, into atheism, in the way 
in which Christ has gone into it, has experienced it and has died of it – he, im-
mortal in his humanity as in his divinity” (Sourozh 1967). 
The measure and significance of this kind of solidarity are far-reaching and 
richly meaningful. We shall explore two directions here: dignity and identifica-
tion. But before moving a step forward, there must be highlighted one important 
idea. Although our shared human nature is the common ground we have with 
Jesus Christ, it must be clarified that in his case that human nature was taken into 
the divine hypostasis of the Son (but without being absorbed by it) and conse-
quently was free of any sin and sin’s effects. The fact that he experienced human 
suffering, abandonment, and death was possible only because he freely accepted 
all these in his immortal and sinless deified humanity (Rytsar 2012, 105). Some 
may argue  that he did not take our full humanity (since his humanity was deified 
and he did not experience all our sin-generated shortcomings) but he revealed 
the “true humanity… the vocation and goal for humans” is available to all because 
of that common ground. He was the human being Adam and Eve were meant to 
be before the fall and nevertheless, he freely shared our limitations without sin 
and our suffering without guilt.
3. Dignity
Anthony Bloom speaks of the greatness of the man (Sourozh 1967 and 1983), 
which is derived from the high price God is willing to pay for restoring the man 
5 He chooses this “political word” (Rytsar 2012, 180) on purpose. And, in fact, he had in mind an 
ontological “two-fold solidarity,” with God and with humans: “I have used the word solidarity 
advisedly: it is a word of current usage, it denotes a relation with which we are quite familiar: 
the idea of solidarity with each other is easy for us to grasp clearly. Christ chose that two-fold 
solidarity which leads him to the Cross. He chose to be man in the truest and fullest sense of the 
word, to be a stranger to our humanity in nothing except his freedom from sin, but to belong to 
it utterly, because he takes upon himself the sins of the world” (Sourozh 1980). 
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to his original destiny. This included the incarnation, suffering, and death of Je-
sus Christ, the Son of God. So great and so deep was God’s love for his creature 
that he has done everything to bring the human being back in his communion. 
He humbled himself and readily accepted the humiliation of being rejected and 
killed by those created in his image and likeness.
With its hypostatic union of the two natures, human and divine, the incarna-
tion and the high price of salvation also proved the great value of man. A value 
that is to be understood only in this equation includes both God and the human 
person. Without God and without the eternal dimension that is a godly dimen-
sion, the greatness of a man is pure idolatry because it lacks depth; its very con-
tent is “two-dimensional” (Sourozh 1967).
Bloom makes one step further and talks about God’s faith in the human per-
son (Rytsar 2012, 185–188).6 This is a debatable point and one may depart here 
from Bloom but the sense of dignity that God’s love and actions assigned to a 
human being could still be retained from his idea. A dignity that at very least 
means an equal right to sonship for everyone no matter what her or his present 
status is. We can be disobedient, departed, and unworthy but we remain children 
of God. He will not disinherit anyone and every person that will turn back to him 
will have the same status: child of God – not a servant or anything less the son-
ship. The consequence is that each rebel of this world is a dignified son of God 
and potentially repentant child, as we can see in the parable of the prodigal son 
(Sourozh 1967). If this is true, then we must have this in mind when we look at 
the prodigals of this world, be they rebellious by choice or just people who never 
heard of God. It seems safe to state that this could be designated as true and legiti-
mate humanism – a “theocentric humanism” as it was called by another orthodox 
thinker (Nellas 1987, 145–152).
On the other hand, this dignity can be extended to the created order. Since 
the Son of God dwelt in a human body, the material world became “pervaded 
with divinity” in him (Bloom 1971, 66) and thus it was restored to its original 
purpose. In this light, the natural order has a new status, and our bodies are not 
just a burden, which must be mortified, but temples of the Holy Spirit in which 
God could live as the incarnation proved this as possible. The goodness of cre-
ation could then be understood from a fresh perspective. And materialism is not 
only a doctrine to be refuted, but also a possible common ground with those who 
advocate it, considering that Christianity could value the matter in a way that no 
other materialist could, not because of the matter as such but because of its ability 
to be transparent to the divine (Rytsar 2012, 143). An adequate perspective on the 
material world could give scope and an ultimate purpose that lacks in every ma-
6 This “faith” means that he knows we were not created in vain and that he believes we will fulfill 
our creational purpose.  
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terialistic view. The matter is not the product of a cosmic accident but the result 
of intentional action and it encapsulates a transcendent significance. 
4. Identification
What Christians have in common with Jesus and any non-believer is human na-
ture and the experience of being separated from God. For obviously different 
reasons already discussed, this separation from God is a central experience that 
Jesus Christ accepted in solidarity with us. 
Even if for believers this can be only a distant memory, from a time they con-
flicted with God, still there is a way of experiencing something similar in God’s 
silence. Whether this silence is caused by sin, a false vision of oneself, or is just an 
opportunity for spiritual growth (Rytsar 2012, 333–343),7 this experience could 
connect Christians with everyone else that is alienated from God. 
The challenge that the metropolitan of Surozh is making goes even farther: if 
Jesus was willing to accept the loss of God for us, how far would we go? If we say 
that we are in Christ, would we share “the full measure of life and death” in the 
way he did? Would we risk everything to the point of “either salvation together 
or lose all things together”? (Sourozh 1967). Although this could suggest some 
problematic views – a purported universalism or a kind of salvation we can offer 
– the idea that Bloom is trying to underline goes in another direction: 
Our solidarity must be with Christ first, and in him with all men to the last 
point, to the full measure of life and death. Only then, if we accept this, can 
we, each of us, and can the congregation of all faithful people, the people of 
God, grow into what it was in Christ and into what it was in the Apostles, 
into a group of people whose vision was greater than the vision of the world, 
whose scope was greater than the scope of the world so that the Church in the 
beginning could contain all these, could be partakers of all those things which 
were the condition of man, and therefore could lead mankind into salvation. 
And this is not the state in which we are (Sourozh 1967).
One should not fully agree with Bloom, but his provocative questions and 
insights do reveal the extent and the completeness of Christ’s identification with 
us in our tragic human condition. His boldness could be eye-opening to the vast 
and bewildering actions of God. We truly are agents of God’s love and we need to 
feel and practice genuine solidarity with those who do not share the same faith 
7 Rytsar discusses the reasons why, according to Bloom, we encounter God’s absence in prayer, 
but this is not identical with to the absence experienced by those who do not know God, alt-
hough could be experienced in a similar manner and could give us a hint about and atheist 
experience.
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in God. Salvation is in no way in our power, but we can open the way for others 
towards it instead of blocking it because of our lack of empathy.
If the cross witnessed the God-forsakenness of Jesus Christ, the “a-theist” mo-
ment of his death, then the atheism of human beings could be seen in itself as a 
cross since it is a way of life without God (Bloom 1996). Nevertheless, whether 
knowingly or unknowingly, the most desired goal of one’s life is the God-Man, 
our eschatological telos, which is our perfect model of humanity revealed by God. 
This can be seen in believers by anyone (Rytsar 2012, 230). Since this point re-
mains unexplained, one could only speculate – but Blooms offers some hints in 
different parts of his work8 – what features of God’s image, the redeemed human 
being, could be seen in a believer’s eyes. Maybe a warmth and a gentleness that 
welcomes the others without judging them and an understanding of the common 
shortcomings and caprices of our fallen humanity. And also the joy, love, and 
kindness we share that is not from us but only through us. In any case, it seems 
that there is a great responsibility that Christians have but also a great opportu-
nity to live out as God-bearers. And they can display that new humanity that any 
human being desires.
5. Secularism
Anthony Bloom considered that secularism has “two general strands” in the 
world: “the loss of sense of God” and “excessive attentiveness to the world’s de-
sires, pressures, and demands” (Rytsar 2012, 230). Both these strands could be 
roughly assimilated to what Charles Taylor sets out as the second meaning of 
secular as “the falling religious belief and practice” (Taylor 2007, 2) but they could 
also be partially related especially to Taylor’s third sense, in which “faith… is one 
human possibility among others” (Taylor 2007, 3). 
Bloom’s goal was not so much to have a polished definition for what it means 
secular as to point out a possible explanation for the situation itself. And he iden-
tified a two-folded cause for which Christians are responsible. On one hand, they 
represented God poorly throughout history and they diminished the human be-
ing to the point of granting it no value whatsoever (Rytsar 2012, 230–231). So 
neither God nor man is rightfully presented to the world and to those who are 
atheists. Given these circumstances, it is no wonder that people react to this fall-
ing short. A God who is misrepresented can justly stir refusal and contempt. A 
human being is too insignificant and risible fuels rejection and compensatory 
8 Rytsar surveyed some aspects in a section called “Vocation of Christians to the Kenotic Way 
of Life”, where he emphasizes “renouncing oneself ”, “sacrificial generous life-giving”, “risk of 
being abandoned”, “being sensitive to the needs of others”, all because of love and because of 
our identification with Christ for the sake of our neighbours (Rytsar 2016, 374–378).
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attempts of restoring his or her value on the cost of God and thus protracting 
the opposition and the conflict Jesus came to resolve in himself (Sourozh 1983). 
However, Bloom’s explanation for secularism is debatable  but it offers a per-
spective that is often stated (in different forms which underline our inadequacy 
as God’s witnesses), though rarely explored in depth. And whereas we repre-
sent God poorly, there can be something challenging and fruitful in pondering 
whether our anthropology is taking into account the incredible high-status a hu-
man person achieves in the Son of Man and of God. The Orthodox metropolitan 
is careful to relate this value of man to God who supplies its content. In his an-
thropological view, a human being cannot achieve greatness without God as the 
alternative is idolatry.
Conclusion
In this article, we explored the potential of the kenotic theology of Anthony 
Bloom for identifying with atheists. In the mystery of the cross, we could see 
Christ experiencing our death, freely chosen, and in that experience, the loss of 
God as an etymological “a-theism.” But human beings live a life of separation 
from God because of sin. We all start as atheists, in this etymological sense, as 
we are without God. Christ decided to identify with us in our tragic condition. 
Therefore, there is this common ground where all can see how he could under-
stand our state by partaking in it. This image could help us to look differently at 
those who do not believe in God or any god. 
At the same time, the incarnation was a demonstration that God values his 
creatures enough to give his only Son to die for them to get them back in a prop-
er relationship with him. This invests human nature with great dignity and also 
brings matter itself to new worthiness. Moreover, the respect for human beings 
and the material order is a point that Christians and atheists could easily share, 
although they undoubtedly start with different assumptions, this could neverthe-
less be a bridge for dialogue. And it is in this dialogue that Christians could show 
the Christlike persons they could become, offering a glimpse of the ideal man all 
humans beings crave.
In the end, we could ponder on some possible responsibilities of Christians 
for the present process of secularization. In Bloom’s view, Christians must restore 
the image of God and the image of a man they are projecting because these are 
both distorted. If that is the case, then we are prompted to ponder some changes.
All these have some possible consequences for every missionary project as we 
are all missionaries or witnesses in a legitimate sense. In the first place, we can 
take upon ourselves some responsibilities for the bad things we rightly rebuke 
in the world. In other words, a critical attitude would be two-ways, and this fa-
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cilitates a humbler starting point for the Christian’s part. Secondly, the atheists 
could be looked at through Christ’s own experience of God-forsakenness. The 
perspective is truly bewildering and could generate new insights worth explor-
ing. Thirdly, Bloom can help us to reconsider the image we have of God, of man, 
and the material world. It is not necessary to embrace metropolitan’s view entirely 
but it remains useful to stir an awareness about our underlying convictions and 
beliefs in our interpersonal relationships and attitudes. 
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Teofil Stanciu
A-teistički Krist: kenoza kao način identifikacije  
s ateistima u teologiji Anthonyja Blooma
Sažetak
Za metropolita Anthonyja Blooma, kenoza Isusa Krista doživljava svoj vrhunac 
njegovim napuštanjem od strane Boga na križu. Upravo taj aspekt kenoze nastoji 
se u ovom članku obraditi i dodatno produbiti. Ključni element bit će značenje 
pojma „a-teistički“ Krist – izraza kojeg je skovao Bloom – te kako njegov sta-
tus kao utjelovljenog Sina može biti temelj naše identifikacije i solidarnosti s 
današnjim ateistima. Budući da inkarnacija, na osnovi kenoze, spaja u jednu hi-
postazu božansku i ljudsku narav, ta stvarnost daruje našoj naravi i stvorenom 
poretku važnost. Ovaj članak istražuje mogućnosti koje proizlaze iz te važnosti i 
kako to može poslužiti kao sredstvo dijaloga s humanistima i materijalistima. To 
može otvoriti dijalog sa sekularnim svijetom i, kao što Bloom predlaže, kršćani 
mogu preuzeti određenu odgovornost za proces sekularizacije. Svrha je ovog 
članka pokazati da Bloomova kontroverzna ideja a-teističkog Krista može postati 
točka poveznica s „drugom stranom“ i ogledalo u kojem zapadni kršćani mogu 
promotriti neke od svojih antropoloških nedostataka koji sprječavaju njihovu 
solidarnost i dijalog s onima koji ne dijele njihovu vjeru u Boga. 
